

Towards EXtreme scale Technologies and Accelerators for euROhpc hw/Sw Supercomputing Applications for exascale



textarossa

WP2 New accelerator designs exploiting mixed precision

D2.4 eXtreme Secure Crypto IP, part 1

<http://textarossa.eu>



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TEXTAROSSA

**Towards EXtreme scale Technologies and Accelerators for euROhpc hw/Sw
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List of Acronyms

| Acronym | Definition |
|---------|--|
| ALU | Arithmetic Logic Unit |
| ASIC | Application Specific Integrated Circuit |
| CINI | Consorzio Interuniversitario Nazionale per l'Informatica |
| CPU | Central Processing Unit |
| DNN | Deep Neural Network |
| FP32 | Floating Point 32 bit |
| FPGA | Field Programmable Gate Array |
| FTS | Fast Task Scheduler |
| HE | Homomorphic Encryption |
| HW | Hardware |
| HPC | High-Performance-Computing |
| INFN | Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare |
| IP | Intellectual Property |
| IPR | Intellectual Property Rights |
| XOF | eXtensible Output Function |
| PMB | Project Management Board |
| PPU | Posit Processing Unit |
| PQC | Post Quantum Cryptography |
| RISC | Reduced Instruction Set Computer |
| SEAL | Simple Encrypted Arithmetic Library |
| SW | Software |
| RLWE | Ring Learning With Errors |
| UART | Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter interface |
| VHDL | VHSIC Hardware Description Language |

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| VPU | Vector Processor Unit |
|-----|-----------------------|

Executive Summary

This document reports the activities done by Textarossa partners CINI (UNIPISA), with reference to preliminary HDL design, verification and synthesis of accelerator IPs in WP2 for cryptography.

The suite of the IPs are called eXtreme Secure Crypto IPs.

The eXtreme Secure Crypto IPs are designed according to the specs defined in D2.1.

1. Introduction

This document D2.4 reports the activities done by Textarossa partner CINI (UNIPISA) in WP2.

D2.4 deals with the preliminary HDL design, using SystemVerilog, verification and synthesis of accelerator IPs for cryptography.

The suite of the IPs are called eXtreme Secure Crypto IPs and are designed according to the specs in D2.1.

After this introduction, Section 2 shows the design of accelerators for innovative security services based on Post Quantum Cryptographic (PQC) techniques, useful also for homomorphic encryption.

Two services are considered:

- Homomorphic Encryption (HE) for data privacy of HPC/cloud users ;
- eXtensible Output Functions (XOF) SHAKE 128/256 in Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC).

Synthesis results in FPGA technology are shown.

Conclusions are drawn in Section 3.

2. eXtreme Secure Crypto IP

This chapter highlights the hardware design and the implementation results on FPGA of the following cryptography functions and services:

- Homomorphic Encryption (HE) in the Internet of Things (IoT) context;
- eXtensible Output Functions (XOF) SHAKE 128/256 in Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC).

2.1. Homomorphic Encryption: SEAL-Embedded Library for IoT devices

Homomorphic Encryption (HE) is a specialized type of encryption that allows specific computations on the encrypted data and generates a ciphertext that, once decrypted, matches the result of operations performed on the plaintext data. HE is nowadays considered a strong privacy-preserving solution that allows users to share data with clouds or any non-secure server. However, HE requires high computational resources and memory consumption, which limits its use in resources constrained IoT devices. Different HE libraries exist, and the main ones are Microsoft SEAL [1], PALISADE [2], and HELib [3]. Nevertheless, all of them are not specifically designed for resources-constrained devices. The SEAL-Embedded (SE) library [4] is the first HE library targeted for embedded devices that employs several optimizations to perform the encoding and encryption of data, featuring the CKKS HE scheme. SE follows the lattice-based algorithm Ring Learning With Errors, which states that given R_Q^n ring of integer modulo Q with degree less than n and given an error distribution χ , the ciphertext can be computed as a couple of polynomials (a, b) such that $b = a \cdot s + e \pmod{Q}$ where $e \in \chi$, $a \in R_Q$ and s is the secret polynomial (it assumes the meaning of secret key). Retrieving the secret s is considered hard even for quantum computers. In SE polynomial degree n is chosen as a power of two. Following the RLWE algorithm on SE all elements are polynomials represented as n -length vectors of their unsigned integer coefficients, whose values may vary in the range of $[0, Q - 1]$. SE encrypts data following the Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song (CKKS) scheme, allowing encryption over floating point values. The two main functions of the SE are:

- Encoding: since encryption and decryption work on polynomial rings it is necessary to convert the floating-point message into unsigned integer polynomial without information loss.
- Encryption: that follows the RLWE encryption.

In this work the focus for the hardware acceleration is the symmetric encryption, which has been evaluated as the main bottleneck of the SE library.

In SE, the ciphertext is evaluated as a couple of vectors of 32-bits unsigned integers such that:

$$\begin{aligned} c_0 &= -a \cdot s + m + e \\ c_1 &= a \end{aligned}$$

where a is randomly sampled from a uniform distribution, e is sampled from a centered binomial distribution, s is the secret key and m is the message to be encrypted (already encoded from floating-point to unsigned integer polynomial).

The following chapters will show first the results of the benchmark campaign carried out using RISC-V processors on FPGA technology of the symmetric encryption function of the SE library, and next the design strategy and the implementation results of the hardware accelerator.

Benchmark on RISC-V CPUs

The source code of the SEAL-Embedded library can be found in [5]. Two different RISC-V processors have been selected for the benchmark campaign, and two different environments have been implemented on the FPGA Board Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC ZCU106 equipped with the System-on-Chip (SoC) XCZU7EV-2FFVC1156. Figure 2-1 shows the proposed hardware systems running the benchmark. The selected RISC-V processors are:

- The 32-bit RISC-V RISCY, whose HDL code can be downloaded in [6]. The left side of Figure 2-1 shows the complete system implemented in the target FPGA which encompasses the RISCY CPU, 256KB of on-chip memory, and AXI4 peripherals (i.e. JTAG and serial UART interface).
- The 64-bit RISC-V CVA6, whose HDL code can be downloaded in [7]. The right side of Figure 2-1 shows the complete system implemented in the target FPGA which includes the CVA6 CPU, 512MB of memory (i.e. onboard DDR4), and AXI4 peripherals (i.e. JTAG and serial UART interface).

Both systems run at 100 MHz of frequency on the target FPGA.




Figure 2-1: RISC-V based systems for benchmarking the SEAL-Embedded library.

Table 2-1 shows the benchmark results of the symmetric encryption function of the SEAL Embedded library on the selected CPUs.

| Poly-Degree | Msg size | CVA6 (64-bit) | RISCY (32-bit) |
|-------------|----------|---------------|----------------|
| 1024 | 2048 B | 17.19 ms | 207.10 ms |
| 2048 | 4096 B | 37.09 ms | 444.22 ms |
| 4096 | 8192 B | 273.80 ms | 2806.43 ms |
| 8192 | 16384 B | 1184.19 ms | -- |
| 16384 | 32768 B | 5861.02 ms | -- |

Table 2-1: Benchmark results for the encryption function of the SEAL-Embedded Library. Column 1 indicates the selected polynomial degree for the RLWE encryption, column 2 indicates the message size in Bytes, column 3 shows the results for the CVA6 processor and column 4 the results for the RISCY processor. Both CPUs run at 100 MHz.

Despite the SEAL-Embedded being targeted for resource-constrained devices, it cannot be successfully executed on the RISCY CPU for Poly-Degree higher than 4096 (256KB of memory are not enough). In addition, the latency for the encryption process is extremely high: around 3 seconds are required to encrypt 8 KB with 4096 Poly-Degree. The following are the specifications of the hardware accelerator defined in the D2.1 deliverable:

- Hardware acceleration of the symmetric encryption function of the SEAL-Embedded library. All the poly-degrees must be supported.
- Encryption latency around hundreds of milliseconds;
- Standard AXI4 memory-mapped interface; desirably a DMA interface.

Hardware accelerator design and implementation results on FPGAs

The target for the hardware acceleration is the RLWE encryption function $c_0 = -a \cdot s + m + e$, where a is randomly sampled from a uniform distribution, e is sampled from a centered binomial distribution, s is the secret key and m is the message to be encrypted. Figure 2-2 reports the hardware-software partitioning of the aforementioned function. Considering the overhead caused by polynomial multiplication, in SE this operation is optimized utilizing the Number Theoretic Transform (NTT), computed following the Harvey Butterfly operations. In a polynomial multiplication between two $(n-1)$ degree polynomials, evaluating the NTT of both allow to multiply their coefficient in a point-wise manner, reducing the complexity of the polynomial multiplication from $O(n^2)$ to $O(n \log n)$.




Figure 2-2: Hardware-software partitioning for the acceleration of symmetric encryption function of the SE library.

NTT is a specialized form of the Discrete Fourier Transform except that operates over a prime field instead of a complex field. Given a polynomial $a = (a_0, a_1, \dots, a_{n-1}) \in R_q$ and the primitive root of unity ω , the NTT outputs a vector $A = (A_0, A_1, \dots, A_{n-1})$ following the equation:

$$A_i = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} a_j \omega^{ij}$$

where $0 \leq j \leq n$. The multiplication between two polynomials a and b becomes:

$$a \cdot b = (1, \omega^{-1}, \dots, \omega^{-(n-1)}) \bullet NTT^{-1}(NTT(A) \bullet NTT(B))$$

where \bullet indicates the coefficient-wise multiplication. Operatively, the NTT is executed through butterfly-operations among polynomial coefficients and $(n - 1)$ powers of a primitive root of unity ω (denoted as twiddle factors). The Harvey Butterfly configuration (reported in Figure 2-3) is used.




Figure 2-3: Harvey Butterfly configuration. The parameter r indicates the twiddle factors, U and V are the polynomial coefficients.

Figure 2-4 reports the overall architecture of the hardware accelerator, and the main blocks are:

- An AXI4 Slave interface (indicated as AXI Slave in Figure 2-4) that can be used to communicate with both the CPU and the DMA. The data size is 32-bit and the address size is 18-bit.
- The interface registers (indicated as Decoding Logic in Figure 2-4) that allows to configure and to check the status of the hardware accelerator.
- The CKKS encryption (indicated as CKKS Encryption in Figure 2-4) module that executes the RLWE encryption algorithm.
- A finite state machine (indicated as CKKS Core Fsm in Figure 2-4) to manage the operation flow.




Figure 2-4: Overall architecture of the hardware accelerator for SE.

The internal architecture of the CKKS Encryption module is reported in Figure 2-5; it features the following hardware modules:

- The shared DPRAM, which is a Dual-Port RAM shared among the CPU/DMA and the hardware accelerator. It is used to write the polynomials a , s and $(m+e)$ and to read the ciphertext.
- DPRAM1 and DPRAM2, which are used to store the polynomial coefficients during the computation of NTT and RLWE encryption.
- ALU Butterfly, which is an Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU) performing modular addition, subtraction, multiplication and the Harvey Butterfly configuration.
- The Root Generator module and the Root RAM to respectively compute and store the powers of the primitive root of unity ω .




Figure 2-5: Internal architecture of the CKKS encryption module.

The hardware accelerator for SE has been implemented on the FPGA Board Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC ZCU106 equipped with the System-on-Chip (SoC) XCZU7EV-2FFVC1156. The block design implemented in the EDA tool Vivado 2020.2 is reported in Figure 2-6. The system includes the RISCY processor (running at 100 MHz), the Xilinx Central DMA, an AXI4 interconnect logic and standard peripherals (UART, JTAG).




Figure 2-6: Block design implemented in Xilinx Vivado 2020.2 of the proposed system.

Table 2-2 reports a comparison among the software performance (third column) and the software plus hardware acceleration of the symmetric encryption function. In particular, the fourth column includes the results using the CPU as Master in the AXI4 communication instead of the fifth column that considers the Xilinx Central DMA as Master. Table 2-3 shows the resources consumption on the target FPGA. The software results on the RISCY processor are slightly different respect to the benchmark previously presented since the interconnection network is different.

| Polynomial Degree | Msg Size | SW (ms) | HW (ms) | HW DMA (ms) |
|-------------------|----------|----------|---------|-------------|
| 1024 | 2048 B | 168.35 | 7.84 | 0.142 |
| 2048 | 4096 B | 364.53 | 15.68 | 0.297 |
| 4096 | 8192 B | 2352.74 | 93.72 | 1.866 |
| 8192 | 16384 B | 10032.13 | 374.83 | 7.79 |
| 16384 | 32768 B | 45856.85 | 1624.12 | 35.19 |

Table 2-2 Performance results of the hardware accelerator for the symmetric encryption function of the SE library. The first column indicates the polynomial degree, the second the message size, the third indicates the execution time for a full encryption using the RISCY processor, the fourth shows the result of the software plus hardware acceleration and the fifth software plus hardware acceleration with data transfers executed using the Xilinx Central DMA.

| Module | Max. Frequency | CLB LUTs | CLB REGs | BLOCKS RAM | DSPs |
|----------------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|-------------|------------|
| Hardware accelerator | 150 MHz | 2690 (1.167%) | 1408 (0.305%) | 87 (27.88%) | 42 (2.43%) |
| RISCY | 100 MHz | 4487 (1.947%) | 2181 (0.473%) | 0 | 5 (0.289%) |
| AXI4 Interconnect | 100 MHz | 24058 (10%) | 17882 (3.88%) | 80 (25%) | 0 |
| AXI Central DMA | 100 MHz | 1221 (0.529%) | 2168 (0.47%) | 0 | 0 |

Table 2-3: Resources consumption of the proposed system on the (SoC) XCZU7EV-2FFVC1156.

2.2. eXtendable Output Functions (XOF) SHAKE-128/256

An eXtendable Output Function (XOF) is a variable-length HASH function in which the length of the output can be chosen to meet the requirements of individual applications. The XOFs can be specialized to hash functions or used in a variety of other applications. The reference standard for the XOF is the NIST FIPS 202 [8], where two XOFs are specified: SHAKE-128 and SHAKE-256. Several NIST Post-Quantum finalists for both Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) and Digital Signature (DS) adopt the XOF functions SHAKE 128/256: CRYSTALS-Kyber (KEM) and Dilithium (DS), Classic McEliece (KEM), NTRU (KEM), Saber (KEM) and Falcon (DS). In particular, in DS algorithms the hardware acceleration of XOFs becomes crucial since they are employed to HASH messages of any size. Some IoT applications, for instance Over-The-Air update, requires verifying the DS of large messages (e.g. up to Gigabytes) with low latency.

Next section will show the benchmark results of the DS algorithms CRYSTALS-Dilithium and Falcon running on both RISC-V CVA6 and ARM-A53 CPUs, and the implementation results of a hardware accelerator for SHAKE128/256 functions.

Performance evaluation in Post-Quantum Digital Signature Algorithms

The source code of the Crystals-Dilithium and Falcon algorithms can be downloaded at the NIST official page for the PQC competition: <https://pq-crystals.org/>, <https://falcon-sign.info/>. In this case, we

selected the CPUs RISC-V CVA6 and ARM-A53 because they can be reasonably used for IoT applications. Two different environments have been implemented on the FPGA Board UltraScale+ MPSoC ZCU106 equipped with the System-on-Chip (SoC) XCZU7EV-2FFVC1156:

- A RISC-V CVA6-based system, the one reported on the right side of Figure 2-1. In this case, the entire system is implemented on the target FPGA at 100 MHz of frequency.
- An ARM-A53-based hard-core system running at 1.2 GHz of frequency. The processor is connected to 2 GB of DDR4 memory.

Table 2-3 reports the results for the DS verification function of CRYSTALS-Dilithium and Falcon algorithms with different message lengths (i.e. from 10KB to 100 MB) on the RISC-V CVA6 CPU, while Table 2-4 reports similar results on the ARM-A53 CPU (in this case the message length varies from 10KB to 1 GB).

| Message length[byte] | VERIFICATION FUNCTION – RISC-V CVA6 processor | | | |
|----------------------|---|-------------|--------------|---------------|
| | Dilithium-2 | Dilithium-5 | Falcon - 512 | Falcon - 1024 |
| 10K | 30,27 ms | 69,21 ms | 14,11 ms | 16,91 ms |
| 100K | 104,85 ms | 143,60 ms | 83,99 ms | 86,88 ms |
| 1M | 865,77 ms | 904,37 ms | 799,24 ms | 802,12 ms |
| 10M | 8455,38 ms | 8492,71 ms | 7.933,16 ms | 7.936,13 ms |
| 100M | 84351,33 ms | 84375,76 ms | 79.273,83 ms | 79.275,83 ms |

Table 2-4: Computation time for the DS verification function of CRYSTALS-Dilithium and Falcon algorithms on the RISC-V CVA6 CPU.

| Message length [byte] | VERIFICATION FUNCTION – ARM-A53 processor | | | |
|-----------------------|---|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| | Dilithium-2 | Dilithium-5 | Falcon - 512 | Falcon - 1024 |
| 10K | 4,65 ms | 10,37 ms | 4,6 ms | 6,26 ms |
| 100K | 13,80 ms | 19,52 ms | 33,08 ms | 34,71 ms |
| 1M | 107,77 ms | 113,49 ms | 325,00 ms | 326,63 ms |
| 10M | 1.045,22 ms | 1.050,89 ms | 3.236,75 ms | 3.238,38 ms |
| 100M | 10.419,43 ms | 10.424,82 ms | 32.354,11 ms | 32.355,73 ms |
| 1G | 104.161,53 ms | 104.167,26 ms | 323.527,44 ms | 323.529,06 ms |

Table 2-5: Computation time for the DS verification function of CRYSTALS-Dilithium and Falcon algorithms on the ARM-A53 CPU.

Hardware accelerator design and implementation results on FPGAs

The eXtensible Output Functions (XOF) SHAKE128/256 are described in the SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions [9]. Unlike SHA-3 functions, the output length of the SHAKE functions can be chosen arbitrarily to meet the requirements of individual applications. The SHAKE functions follow the structure described in [10], named the sponge construction, which is composed of two processes, the absorbing and the squeezing ones. The first process compresses the input value using the KECCAK- p permutations, which are defined by two

parameters: the length of the strings that are permuted, called the width or the state (and denoted with b) of the permutation, and the number of iterations called rounds (and denoted with n_r). In particular, the KECCAK- $p[1600,24]$ that underlies the SHA-3 family functions, acts on a state of 1600-bit, and requires 24 rounds. A round of the KECCAK- p consists of a sequence of five transformations, which are called step mapping, consisting of five processes: θ , ρ , π , χ , and ι . A detailed explanation of these processes can be found in [10]. The state is separated in the first r bits named the rate and the remaining $c = b - r$ bits named capacity.

As depicted in Figure 2-7, in the absorbing phase the first message block (of r bits) is XORed with the initial state (all zeroes), and then the KECCAK- $p[1600,24]$ is applied. For the next message blocks, they are XORed with r bits of the state and the KECCAK- $p[1600,24]$ is applied again. This operation continues until the whole message is consumed. After that, the squeezing phase outputs an arbitrarily number of r bits: after a r bits block is squeezed out, the KECCAK- $p[1600,24]$ is applied again to the state. If the desired output is shorter than the provided r bits blocks, the last block can be truncated.




Figure 2-7: Sponge construction for the SHA3 family functions.

The architecture of the hardware accelerator for SHAKE128/256 is represented in Figure 2-8. It includes an AXI4 Memory Mapped Slave interface with a 64-bit data bus, a 1344-bit shift register for input/output from/to the AXI Master interface, a dedicated 1600-bit state register and the combinational logic for the KECCAK- p permutations and padding. The configuration register allows to set the number of input blocks to be processed and the last block size for padding. Table 2-6 shows the synthesis results for the proposed hardware accelerators on the FPGA Board Xilinx ZCU106.




Figure 2-8: Architecture of the hardware accelerator for SHAKE128/256 functions.

| Max. frequency | CLB LUTs | CLB REGs | BLOCKS RAM | DSPs |
|----------------|----------|----------|------------|------|
| 330 MHz | 6172 | 3327 | 0 | 0 |

Table 2-6: Resource consumption of the hardware accelerator for SHAKE128/256 functions.

The hardware accelerator has been integrated in two SoC including based on a RISC-V CVA6 processor and an ARM Cortex-A53, as presented in Figure 2-9.




Figure 2-9: On the left side the RISC-V based system and on the right side the ARM-A53 based system. Both systems include the hardware accelerator for SHAKE128/256.

The RISC-V based system is connected to 512MB of DDR4 memory and to standard peripherals (i.e. UART and JTAG) provided as Vivado hardware IPs. The clock frequency for CPU and peripherals/interconnect is 100MHz. The ARM-A53 based system includes 2GB of DDR4 memory, and the UART peripheral to communicate with the host PC. The clock frequency of the ARM-A53 is 1.2 GHz. The accelerator has been synthesized at its maximum frequency reported in Table 2-6. The performance results for the DS verification function of CRYSTALS-Dilithium and Falcon algorithms running on the RISC-V based system (i.e. RISC-V CVA6 plus hardware accelerator, left side of Figure 2-9) are reported in Table 2-7, instead the performance results on the ARM-A53 system (i.e. ARM-A53 plus hardware accelerator, right side of Figure 2-9) are reported in Table 2-8.

| Message length[byte] | VERIFICATION FUNCTION – RISC-V CVA6 processor | | | |
|----------------------|---|-------------|--------------|---------------|
| | Dilithium-2 | Dilithium-5 | Falcon - 512 | Falcon - 1024 |
| 10K | 21.42 ms | 60.41 ms | 6.19 ms | 12.12 ms |
| 100K | 30.76 ms | 69.53 ms | 15.06 ms | 21.04 ms |
| 1M | 125.03 ms | 163.78 ms | 112.19 ms | 115.26 ms |
| 10M | 1104.29 ms | 1142.70 ms | 1091.13 ms | 1094.49 ms |
| 100M | 11277.23 ms | 11314.93 ms | 11267.40 ms | 11267.40 ms |

Table 2-7: Computation time for the DS verification function of CRYSTALS-Dilithium and Falcon algorithms on the RISC-V CVA6 CPU plus the hardware accelerator for SHAKE128/256 functions.

| Message length [byte] | VERIFICATION FUNCTION – ARM-A53 processor | | | |
|-----------------------|---|-------------|--------------|---------------|
| | Dilithium-2 | Dilithium-5 | Falcon - 512 | Falcon - 1024 |
| 10K | 3.47 ms | 9.05 ms | 1.21 ms | 2.53 ms |
| 100K | 4.10 ms | 9.68 ms | 1.84 ms | 3.16 ms |
| 1M | 10.55 ms | 16.13 ms | 8.28 ms | 9.62 ms |
| 10M | 75.11 ms | 80.66 ms | 73.25 ms | 74.18 ms |
| 100M | 720.46 ms | 725.71 ms | 719.52 ms | 719.52 ms |
| 1G | 7345.00 ms | 7348.19 ms | 7342.34 ms | 7342.34 ms |

Table 2-8: Computation time for the DS verification function of CRYSTALS-Dilithium and Falcon algorithms on the ARM-A53 CPU plus the hardware accelerator for SHAKE128/256 functions.

3. Conclusions

This document reports the activities done by Textarossa partner CINI (UNIPISA), with reference to the consolidated specifications of accelerator IPs in D2.1, and preliminary HDL design, verification and synthesis results, mainly in FPGA technology for cryptographic IPs.

D2.4 deals with the preliminary HDL design, using SystemVerilog, verification and synthesis of accelerator IPs for cryptography.

Section 2 has shown the design of accelerators for innovative security services based on Post Quantum Cryptographic (PQC) techniques, useful also for homomorphic encryption.

Two services are considered:

- Homomorphic Encryption (HE) for data privacy of HPC/cloud users ;
- eXtensible Output Functions (XOF) SHAKE 128/256 in Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC).

The proposed IPs are interesting, also in view of synergies between Textarossa and the other initiatives like EPI and the European Pilot, since all the proposed accelerators can be integrated with RISC-V computing cores like the RISC-V 64b Ariane IP and the RISC-V with support of the Vector extension in the EPAC (European Processor Accelerator).

4. References

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